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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. BACKGROUND 
According to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the DoD acquisition 
process is not getting new systems to the field quickly enough. Our current average 
acquisition response time is 10 years, longer for major weapon systems. We are 
delivering technology that is at least a generation old. To reverse this trend, we must 
change our ways of doing business. This starts by taking advantage of private sector 
expertise and forging a new compact with the warfighter.1  These comments, and those 
that follow, provide insight into the reason why Secretary Rumsfeld has attempted to 
transform the way DoD does business.  When Secretary Rumsfeld spoke to the Senate 
Armed Services Committee on June 21, 2001, he recognized the new state of the world 
and the need for increased speed in the acquisition process.  “The new threats are on the 
horizon. And with the speed of change today – where technology is advancing not in 
decades but in months and years – we cannot afford to wait until they have emerged 
before we prepare to meet them. After the new threats emerge, this opportunity may not 
be available. The risks of transformation could be much greater then – perhaps 
unacceptably so”.2  The DoD Acquisition System is set-up to reduce the risk of failing 
and is not known for its speed in execution.   
Congress has recognized the rigidity of the defense acquisition system when they 
issued the 2003 Defense Appropriations Act.  They stated “…Navy's research and 
acquisition community historically has had great difficulty in transitioning innovative 
technologies from government research organizations and the commercial marketplace to 
active development and procurement programs.  Due to the constraints of internal 
planning and budgeting processes, and the stifling legacy of `programs of record', new 
                                                 
1 Air Force Institute of Technology. Acquisition training. Retrieved October 25, 2006, from 
http://www.afit.edu/ls/knowledge/KO-04/DOD5000_KO04.htm. 
2 Experiences and recommendations for innovation and defense transformation: House Armed Services 
Committee Joint Subcommittee Hearing of the Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee and Projection 




Navy systems are often fielded with a high degree of technological obsolescence….”3  
While the comments were made in relation to the Department of the Navy one can draw 
the same conclusion for the Air Force in terms of the dilemma we have in bringing 
innovative technologies to the warfighter.  This correlation can be drawn because the Air 
Force and Navy both play by the same rules of the defense acquisition system.  Why has 
the DoD which used to be a leader in research and development efforts suddenly having 
difficulty in bringing new technologies to the warfighter quickly? 
One reason is the lack of real competition among defense contractors.  In 1985, 
defense programs were conducted in a robust market environment where over 20 fully 
competent prime contractors competed for multiple new programs each year. The 
industrial base was supported by huge annual production runs of aircraft (585), combat 
vehicles (2,031), ships (24) and missiles (32,714). Most important, there were well-
known, well-defined threats and stable strategic planning by the Department. Today, the 
Department relies on six prime contractors that compete for fewer and fewer programs 
each year. In 2005 reductions in plant capacity have failed to keep pace with reduction in 
demand for defense systems, (188 aircraft, 190 combat vehicles, eight ships, and 5,072 
missiles).4  This reduced pool of competitors has also reduced the pool of innovative 
thinkers to solve the defense department’s problems.   
Another reason is the shift in the primary sources of research and development 
spending in the United States.  Prior to the 1970’s, the federal government was the largest 
contributor to U.S. R&D. Since then, the federal government’s contributions have 
remained fairly flat in constant dollars, while industry has shown growth in funding U.S. 
R&D each year.5  This funding shift has actually helped reduce the pool of available 
contractors who found themselves competing for ever shrinking resources.   
Combine the rigid acquisition processes of the DoD, the reduced funding and the 
reduced contractor pool and you have the Air Force’s dilemma today.  A proposed 
                                                 
3 Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2003, House Report 107-532U.S.C. (2003). 
4 Defense Acq performance assessment. 
5 Kei Koizumi, “R&D Funding Trends in the US Government,” American Association for the 
Advancement of Science (2005), 27 October 2005. Retrieved August 15, 2006, from http://www.aaas.org.  
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solution to this dilemma that other government agencies have successfully implemented 
is venture capital.  The ability to leverage commercial resources while obtaining the 
technologies needed to fill an agency need has brought about the CIA’s In-Q-Tel 
program and the Army’s On-Point initiative.  Both programs use government funds to 
finance small, upstart businesses in order to achieve their goals.   
The purpose of this paper is to explore the potential for an Air Force venture 
capital fund to meet the technology needs of the warfighters.  We accomplish this by first 
describing the current traditional acquisition process to understand where the time goes 
when researching and developing a new technology.  We then look into other defense 
programs that are similar to venture capital, but have different purposes and are operated 
on a smaller scale.  After outlining the multiple programs available we explore if venture 
capital will complement the existing programs.  In the event venture capital does fit in 
with the existing programs we provide a recommended model on how an Air Force 
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II. ACQUISITIONS TIMELINE 
A. WAY AHEAD FOR TRANSITION 
With the issuance of the Department of Defense’s Transformation Guidance in 
April 2003, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld set a bold, innovative strategy for 
transitioning the Armed Forces.  He stated “as we prepare for the future, we must think 
differently and develop the kinds of forces and capabilities that can adapt quickly to new 
challenges and to unexpected circumstances. We must transform not only the capabilities 
at our disposal but also the way we think, the way we train, the way we exercise, and the 
way we fight. We must transform not only our armed forces but also the Department that 
serves them by encouraging a culture of creative and prudent risk taking. We must 
promote an entrepreneurial approach to developing military capabilities; one encourages 
people to be proactive, not reactive, and anticipates threats before they emerge."6  Under 
this guidance, the department of defense set out to transform its business practices and 
harness operational synergy between the services.    
With the shift to a more agile and proactive force, the current acquisition process 
needs to change to keep up with the paradigm shift.  As it stands, the current model is 
cumbersome and unresponsive to technological change. This is counterproductive to the 
vision as laid out by the Secretary of Defense.  In the near term, it doesn’t meet the 
warfighter needs of rapid technology transference.  Secretary Rumsfeld outlined key 
transformation drivers to expedite the top-down change. 
1. Transformation Drivers 
The critical focus of the transformation drivers is on speed and efficiency to the 
end user; the warfighter.  Two of the key transformation drivers are; 1) support for joint 
warfighting capability and 2) reduced cost of business operations.  Greater commonality 
is needed between the forces and the Department of Defense.  The Department’s business 
                                                 
6 Commander, US Joint Forces Command. (2004). Delivering innovation: The joint concept 
development and experimentation campaign plan FY 2004-2011.  
 6
infrastructure must be compatible with the global, networked military it supports.7  As 
the USD (AT&L) website states “Defense business operations are being streamlined so 
that DoD can more effectively deliver warfighting capabilities, deal with growing 
pressures on resources, and benefit from economies of scale. Costly and outdated 
systems, procedures, and programs tax resources from warfighting and stifle innovation. 
The nation’s defense dollars must be better applied to mission effectiveness and 
sustaining an effective long-term force posture.”8  In order to be cost effective and deliver 
the needed capabilities to the warfighter, a revolution in the way we do business needs to 
occur. 
2. Defense Acquisitions Framework 
The present era of rapidly evolving technologies and uncertain, explicit threats 
makes it undesirable to take 15-20 years to develop and produce a new defense weapon 
system.  The Department of Defense’s Acquisition tutorial states “a 21st century 
acquisition process must encourage efficiency, flexibility, creativity, and innovation in 
order to provide modern technology to the warfighter in a timely manner.”9 
DoD Series 5000 sets the framework and guidelines for Defense Acquisitions.  
These directives and policies differ from past versions because they: 
• Encourage innovation and flexibility.  
• Permit greater judgment in the employment of acquisition principles.  
• Focus on outcomes vice processes.  
• Empower program managers to use the acquisition system vice being 
hampered by over-regulation.10 
The overarching process focuses on delivering capabilities and improvements as 
fast as possible.  Innovations, such as evolutionary acquisition and time phasing of 
                                                 
7 Defense Business Transformation Office. (2006). Fact sheet: Business transformation overview. 
Retrieved October 15, 2006, from http://www.dod.mil/dbt/facts_overview.html. 
8 Defense Business Transformation Office. (2006). Reduced cost of business operations. Retrieved 
October 15, 2006, from http://www.dod.mil/dbt/mission_reduced-cost.html.  
9 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition process tutorial. Retrieved September 
15, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/darc/TUTORIAL/index.htm. 
10 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition process tutorial. Retrieved September 
15, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/darc/TUTORIAL/index.htm. 
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requirements emphasize the need to rapidly deploy technology to the warfighter.  Also, 
the 5000 series addresses interoperability, supportability, and affordability.  However, 
even with these transformation initiatives and revisions in policy, the acquisition life 
cycle and process framework can still limit reaction time and adversely affect the rapid 
transference of technology.  There are two distinct phases that run parallel throughout the 
framework.  They are the Joint Capabilities Integration Development System (JCIDS) 
and the Acquisitions Life Cycle Model.  Both are independent, however, they rely 
heavily on inputs and outputs from each other.   
Each part of the process takes time and each has requirements to advance to the 
next level.  Throughout the process, there are several bottlenecks that can potentially 
occur, increasing the overall life cycle time.  We’ll analyze the notional timeline, and 
we’ll compare it to real-world situations where the process slowed down the acquisitions 
process.  On average, it takes about 2-4 years for a program to make it to the Milestone B 




Figure 1.   Acquisitions Timeline (From: Nussbaum) 
 
The first section we’ll review is the JCIDS.  The JCIDS was DoD’s answer to 
ensuring “jointness” with capability requirements.     
B. JCIDS PROCESS 
The JCIDS was designed to realize the transformation efforts and focus synergies 
on joint solutions, rather than service-centric piece meals.  Two months after Secretary 
Rumsfeld introduced his innovative transformation initiative, the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
issued CJCSI 3170.01C, which radically altered the acquisitions process, and set about 
transforming the framework to meet the vision.  JCIDS is the formal DoD procedure 
which defines acquisition requirements and evaluation criteria for future defense 
programs. JCIDS was created to replace the previous service-specific requirements 
generation system, which allegedly created redundancies in capabilities and failed to 
meet the combined needs of all three US military services.11 
JCIDS realizes the demand to meet the needs of and sustain joint forces.  It is the 
response of the Joint Chiefs to the Combatant Commanders need for flexible, distributed, 
and highly-networked operations. JCIDS implements a capabilities-based approach that 
utilizes the expertise of different government agencies, industry, and academia.  JCIDS 
                                                 
11 Wikipedia Contributors. (2006). Joint capabilities integration development system. Retrieved 
August 22, 2006, from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/JCIDS.  
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encourages collaboration between users (COCOMs) and materiel providers early in the 
process, and enhances the ability of organizations to influence proposed solutions to 
capability shortfalls. JCIDS also defines interoperable, joint capabilities that will best 
meet future needs. The broader DoD acquisition community must then deliver these 
technologically sound, sustainable, and affordable increments of militarily useful 
capability to the warfighter.12  In other words, the decades-old “threat-driven,” bottom-
up” development process of warfare-material requirements was summarily replaced by a 
“revolutionary,” “capabilities-driven,” “top-down” process.13  
1. Flow during Pre-Concept Phase 
Joint Concepts are fed into by the DoD Strategic Guidance.  Based on the Joint 
Concepts, a Functional Area Analysis (FAA) is done.  It identifies the operational tasks, 
conditions, and standards needed to achieve military objectives.14  A Functional Needs 
Analysis (FNA) is then built based off of the FAA.  The FNA produces a list of capability 
gaps that require solutions and indicates the time frame in which those solutions are 
needed. It may also identify redundancies in capabilities that reflect inefficiencies.  The 
FNA feeds the Joint Capabilities Document (JCD).  The JCD effectively replaces the 
Mission Needs Statement (MNS) submitted by the users.  The JCD represents the 
COCOM’s (or user) needs with an emphasis on joint “goodness of fit” within the DoD.  
Services and other DoD components may develop ideas and concepts leading to draft 
JCDs.15  JCDs are developed to highlight joint capability needs that will be further 
analyzed by sponsors for possible solutions.  The focus on this process is establishing 
COCOM participation throughout the concept development stage, as opposed to simply 
submitting a MNS for a service-specific need.   
                                                 
12 Defense Acquisition University. (2006). Defense acquisition guidebook: JCIDS. Retrieved 
September 3, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=Guidebook/IG_c1.3.asp.  
13 D.F. Mathews. (2004). The new joint capabilities integration development system (JCIDS) and its 
potential impacts upon defense program managers (Acquisition Research No. NPS-PM-04-017). Monterey, 
CA: Naval Postgraduate School.   
14 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2005). CJCSI 3170.01E joint capabilities integration and 
development system. 
15 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2005). CJCSI 3170.01E joint capabilities integration and 
development system. 
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The solution identification phase is called Functional Solutions Analysis.  All 
possible solutions, both non-material and material, are identified and analyzed.  The 
product of these reviews and analysis is the Initial Capabilities Document (ICD).  The 
ICD proposes a range of approaches based on analysis of the cost, efficacy, sustainability, 
environment, and risk posed by the approaches under consideration. These are further 
refined and supports the ICD helps to shape and provides input to the AoA that will be 
used through the life of the system.  The ICD is due at the Concept Decision and at 
Milestone A.  For non-material solutions or minor material approaches, a DOTMLPF 
Change Recommendation (DCR) is created.  The issuance of the ICD or DCR ends the 
pre-concept phase for the JCIDS process (See Figure 2).   
 
 
Figure 2.   JCIDS Process (From: https://acc.dau.mil/ifc/index.htm. Retrieved September  
2006) 
 
There is no standard timeline for the issuance of the ICD or DCR.  However, the 
process can actually take approximately 6 months based on the capability needed.  One 
real-world example involves the Army’s Palatalized Loading System (PLS) in 1986.  The 
PLS was a technology invented by the British.  It allowed one personnel to load up to 8 
tons of equipment via the automatic lift system.  However, the bottleneck came after the 
Army decided that the current load of 8 tons wasn’t sufficient.  Even though the Army  
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had a proven capability, it decided to re-scope the whole project as a 32 ton load project.  
This added approximately one year of time to the development of the Requirements 
Operational Capability Document, which is the precursor for the ICD.16      
All JCIDS documents flow through a structured staffing/approval process which 
runs concurrent with this capabilities-based assessment.  There are four designators 
within the JCIDS staffing process.  All major programs, including ACAT 1/1A, require 
Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) approval and are designated as JROC 
interest.  The JROC assists the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in identifying the 
priority of joint military to meet the national military strategy, and assist the Chairman in 
considering alternatives to any acquisition program that has been identified to meet 
military requirements by evaluating the cost, schedule, and performance of the 
program.17  ACAT II are designated Joint Integration and require interoperability 
certification.  A Joint Information designation provides all services information on the 
program.  Finally, the independent designator requires no joint force affect or need for 
certification.  JROC Interest items are sent to one of eight Functional Capability Boards 
(FCBs).  The FCB brings all stakeholders together for common review and issue 
resolution.  Also, the FCB prioritizes and assesses capability gaps and proposals.18  
Staffing approval and documentation timelines for JROC interest items are 86 
days.19  So, at a minimum, JCIDS effectively adds 3 months to any capability timeline.  
Again, this requirement timeframe is absent of any renegotiation or critical changes, 





                                                 
16 B. Naegle. (9/6/2006). In-person interview.  
17 Title 10, Subtitle A, Part I, Chapter 7, Section 181 Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 181 
(1996).  
18 D. Kuhlman. (9/272006). Presentation: Joint staff capability based process. 
19 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2005). CJCSI 3170.01B operation of the joint capabilities 
integration and development system.  
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Joint Integration and Independent Staffing requires the same set timeframe through the 
JCIDS process.20 Once the decision is made to end the pre-concept phase, the concept 
refinement (CR) phase begins.   
2. Flow during Concept Refinement Phase 
This represents the first phase of the Defense Acquisition Management 
Framework as defined and established by DoDI 5000.2. The purpose of this phase is to 
refine the concept documented in the ICD and to prepare a Technology Development 
Strategy (TDS).  The TDS will be discussed later.  The Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) decision to begin CR does not constitute program initiation of a new acquisition 
program.21  
Based on the Joint Concepts developed earlier in the JCIDS process, a draft 
Capabilities Development Document (CDD) is developed.  The CDD is a document that 
captures the information necessary to develop a proposed program.  The CDD outlines an 
affordable increment of militarily useful, logistically supportable, and technically mature 
capability. The CDD is needed to support the future Milestone B decision review.22  
Milestone A ends the Concept Refinement stage and begins the Technology 
Development stage.   
3. Flow during Technology Development Phase 
Milestone A decision approval initiates the Technology Development Phase.  The 
purpose of this phase is to reduce technology risk and determine the appropriate set of 
technologies to integrate into the full system.23   
The draft CDD flows through the Joint Staff for certification.  Concurrently, 
several items are used to develop the certification.  First, the Key Performance 
                                                 
20 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. (2005). CJCSI 3170.01B operation of the joint capabilities 
integration and development system.   
21 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Concept refinement phase. Retrieved October 13, 2006, 
from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2423.   
22 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Capability development document (CDD). Retrieved 
September 13, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2363.  
23 Defense Acquisition University. AT&L integrated framework chart: Technology development 
phase. Retrieved September 15, 2006, from https://acc.dau.mil/ifc/02_a.htm. 
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Parameters (KPP) are reviewed.  KPPs are those attributes or characteristics of a system 
that are considered critical or essential to the development of an effective military 
capability and those attributes that make a significant contribution to the key 
characteristics as defined in the Joint Operations Concept.24  KPPs are validated by the 
JROC for JROC Interest documents.  Second, the Information Support Plan (ISP) is 
developed to explore the information-related needs of an acquisition program in support 
of the operational and functional capabilities the program either delivers.   The ISP 
provides a mechanism to identify and resolve implementation issues related to an 
acquisition program's Information Technology (IT), including National Security Systems 
(NSS), infrastructure support and IT and NSS interface requirements.25  These documents 
help facilitate Joint Staff Certification and analysis.  For example, J-6 reviews 
interoperability and supportability; while J-2 analyzes intelligence requirements and 
viable threats.  A key factor is that COCOMs are still present in the capabilities 
validation/certification process.  Service and JROC validation is required for each 
program certified through the Joint Staff.  A System Threat Assessment is performed to 
validate force protection and survivability issues.  All of these certifications and 
parameters are fed into the finalized CDD, and the KPPs are fed into the acquisitions 
process.  Milestone B approval ends the Technology Development stage.  Now, let’s 
review the acquisition life cycle. 
C. ACQUISITIONS LIFECYCLE PROCESS 
The Acquisitions Cycle process is the event-driven process that oversees the 
DoD’s procurement actions.  This process can take years, even decades to complete.  It 
really depends on the size and the scope of the acquisition in question.  The average time 
to reach Milestone B is approximately 2 to 4 years.  However, this timeline can expand or 
contract depending on the program size.  The first stage within the process is the pre-
concept phase. 
                                                 
24 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Key performance parameters (KPP). Retrieved 
September 13, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=1173. 
25 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition guidebook: Information support plan. 
Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=GuideBook\IG_c7.3.6.asp.  
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1. Flow during Pre-Concept Phase 
After the completion of the FSA within the JCIDS process, the event-driven 
defense acquisition system is initiated.  At this point, several things occur simultaneously.  
These steps are indicative of ACAT I programs. ACAT II and III programs have a lower 
reporting and decision level.26  First, oversight and review of the program is vetted to the 
Defense Acquisition review Board (DAB).  The DAB advises the Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD (AT&L)) on critical 
acquisition decisions. The USD (AT&L) chairs the DAB, and the Vice Chairman of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff serves as the co-chair.27  Second, a Milestone Decision Authority 
(MDA) is designated with overall responsibility for a program. The MDA has the 
authority to approve entry of an acquisition program into the next phase of the acquisition 
process and is accountable for cost, schedule, and performance reporting to higher 
authority, including congressional reporting.28  Any decision made on the program is 
documented by an Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).  It is signed by the MDA 
and details decisions made as the result of a Milestone Decision Review (MDR) or 
decision review.   
For a major defense acquisition program (ACAT I), an Analysis of Alternatives 
(AoA) is required at each major milestone.  AoAs are an important element of the 
defense acquisition process. An AoA is an analytical comparison of the operational 
effectiveness, suitability, and Life-Cycle Cost of alternatives that satisfy established 
capability needs. Initially, the AoA process typically explores numerous conceptual 
solutions with the goal of identifying the most promising options, thereby guiding the 
                                                 
26 Defense Acquisition University. (2005). Introduction to defense acquisition management (7th ed.). 
Fort Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press.  
27 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition guidebook: Review procedures. 
Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=DoD5002/DoD5002-3.10.asp. 
28 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Milestone decision authority (MDA). Retrieved October 
13, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=1282.    
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Concept Refinement Phase.29  The Draft AoA plan is developed during the Pre-Concept 
phase.  A complex AoA can take up to two years to complete during this phase.30   
Other considerations are reviewed and analyzed during the Pre-Concept phase.  
First, supportability objectives are defined.  Pre-acquisition presents the first opportunity 
to influence supportability and affordability by balancing threats, technology 
opportunities, and operational requirements. Emphasizing the critical performance-
sustainment link, desired capabilities should be defined in terms not only of objective 
metrics (e.g., speed, lethality), but also of the full range of operational requirements 
(logistics footprint, supportability criteria) to sustain the mission over the long term. 
Assessment and demonstration of technology risk includes those related to supportability 
and to product support. Reliability, reduced logistics footprint, and reduced system life 
cycle cost are most effectively achieved through inclusion from the very beginning of a 
program.31  Also, preliminary integrated architecture is reviewed.  This is an architecture 
consisting of multiple views (operational view, systems view and technical view) that 
facilitates integration and promotes interoperability across capabilities and among related 
architectures.32  Finally, the Program Office Estimate (POE) is completed.  The POE is a 
detailed estimate of acquisition and ownership costs normally required for high-level 
decisions. The estimate is performed early in the program and serves as the base point for 
all subsequent tracking and auditing purposes. 
Exit Criteria are program specific accomplishments that must be satisfactorily 
demonstrated before a program can progress further in the current acquisition phase, or 
transition to the next acquisition phase, or milestone. Exit criteria are normally selected to 
track progress in important technical, schedule, or management risk areas. They are 
                                                 
29 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition guidebook: Analysis of alternatives. 
Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=Guidebook/IG_c3.3.asp.   
30 J.T. Bennet. (2006). Plan in works to overhaul military's embattled acquisition process. Inside the 
Air Force, September 5, 2006. 
31 Defense Acquisition University. (2006). Defense acquisition guidebook: Pre-acquisition. Retrieved 
October 13, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=Guidebook/IG_c5.4.1.asp.   
32 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Integrated architecture. Retrieved September 13, 2006, 
from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2866. 
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typically some level of a demonstrated performance outcome (e.g., level of engine 
thrust), the accomplishment of some process at some level of efficiency (e.g., 
manufacturing yield), the successful accomplishment of some event (e.g., first flight), or 
some other criterion (e.g., establishment of a training program or inclusion of a particular 
clause in the follow-on contract) contract) that indicates that aspect of the program is 
progressing satisfactorily. Exit criteria serve as gates that, when successfully passed or 
exited, demonstrate the program is on track to achieve its final program goals and should 
be allowed to continue with additional activities within an acquisition phase or be 
considered for continuation into the next acquisition phase.  Exit criteria are documented 
in the Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM).33  An ADM is issued by the MDA to 
detail exit criteria and complete the Concept Decision Review phase.  The MDA is the 
decision authority for starting the Concept Refinement phase.   
2. Flow during Concept Refinement Phase 
The Concept Refinement phase represents the first substantial opportunity to 
influence systems design by balancing technology opportunities, schedule constraints, 
funding availability, performance parameters, and operational requirements. Desired user 
capabilities are expressed in terms of Key Performance Parameters and other parameters, 
and should be defined at this point.34  This phase refines the initial concept and generates 
a Technology Development Strategy (TDS).  The framework incorporates a Technology 
Development Phase focused on the development, maturation, and evaluation of the 
technologies needed for the capability under consideration. Phase activities concentrate 
on maturing those technologies (consistent with recommended Technology Readiness 
Levels) and demonstrating readiness to proceed with program initiation.  The TDS 
focuses specifically on the activities of the Technology Development Phase. The TDS 
details program strategy; cost, schedule, and performance goals; exit criteria for first tech 
demonstration; and a test plan.  It precedes the formal Acquisition Strategy and is 
                                                 
33 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Exit criteria. Retrieved September 13, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2675. 
34 Defense Acquisition University. (2006). Defense acquisition guidebook: Alternative system review 
(ASR). Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=GuideBook\IG_c4.3.1.4.2.asp. 
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required for Milestone A. The TDS is updated at subsequent milestones and subsumed 
into the Acquisition Strategy. If the Acquisition Strategy is approved at Milestone A, the 
TDS may be included in the Acquisition Strategy.35  
During Concept Refinement, an Initial Technical Review (ITR) is completed.  
The ITR is a multi-disciplined technical review held early during this phase to support a 
programs initial Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) submission. The review 
ensures that a programs technical baseline is sufficiently rigorous to support a valid 
cost estimate (with acceptable cost risk), and enable an independent assessment of that 
estimate by cost, technical, and program management subject matter experts.36  
The output for this review is the Alternative System Review (ASR).  The ASR is 
a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that the resulting set of requirements agrees 
with the customers' needs and expectations and the system under review can proceed into 
Technology Development.  The ASR should be complete prior to Milestone A.  
Generally this review assesses the alternative systems that have been evaluated during the 
Concept Refinement phase, and ensures that the preferred system alternative is both cost 
effective and operationally effective.  Of critical importance to this review is the 
understanding of available system concepts to meet the capabilities described in the 
Initial Capabilities Document.  Depending on the overall acquisition strategy, one or 
more preferred solutions may carry forward into the Technology Development phase.37 
Figure 3 details the ITR/ASR dynamic.  Based on the ITR/ASR outputs, as well as the 
AoA, a Preferred System Concept is selected to meet the capability need of the user.  
During this phase, preliminary planning activities are completed.  These include 
preparation of the Acquisition Plan (AP), draft Request for Proposal (RFP), and formal 
RFP, as well as the Source Selection Proposal (SSP). The AP is a formal written 
                                                 
35 Defense Acquisition University. AT&L integrated framework chart: Concept refinement phase. 
Retrieved September 15, 2006, from https://acc.dau.mil/ifc/02_a.htm. 
36 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Initial technical review (ITR). Retrieved September 19, 
2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=3309. 
37 Defense Acquisition University. (2006). Defense acquisition guidebook: Alternative system review 
(ASR). Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=GuideBook\IG_c4.3.1.4.2.asp. 
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document reflecting the specific actions necessary to execute the approach established in 
the approved acquisition strategy and guiding contractual implementation.38  Usually, the 
SSP consists of two parts: (a) describes the organization and responsibilities of the source 
selection team; (b) identifies the evaluation criteria and detailed procedures for proposal 
evaluation.  The draft RFP and the final RFP is a solicitation used in negotiated 
acquisition to communicate government requirements to prospective contractor and to 
solicit proposals.39 
As with the Concept Decision Review, the MDA ensures that Concept 
Refinement Exit Criteria is met.  The decision point, Milestone A, determines entry into 
the Technology Development (TD) phase.  The MDA approves the Milestone Decision, 
and the ADM is created.  This ends the Concept Refinement phase.  As with any phase, 
bottlenecks can occur here too. 
 
 
Figure 3.   ITR/ASR (From: https://acc.dau.mil/ifc/index.htm. Retrieved September 
2006) 
 
                                                 
38 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Acquisition plan (AP). Retrieved September 13, 2006, 
from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2224. 
39 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Request for proposal (RFP). Retrieved September 13, 
2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=1584. 
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Taken the PLS example, we can see another bottleneck during the Concept  
Refinement stage.  After the ICD was finally completed (one year delay), the 
refined concept required extensive work to make it a reality.  Effectively, the refined need 
required an assembly line modification, a rewrite of Army policy and doctrine, and a new 
source selection since the original builder couldn’t handle the modification.40  This added 
an additional 6 years onto the acquisition life cycle.  Now, let’s analyze the Technology 
Development phase.   
3. Flow during Technology Development Phase 
This phase begins the Acquisitions Strategy selection.  The Acquisition Strategy 
defines the approach the program will use to achieve full capability: either evolutionary 
or single step; it should include a brief rationale to justify the choice.  The Acquisition 
Strategy results from extensive planning and preparation and a thorough understanding of 
both the specific acquisition program and the general defense acquisition environment.  
Development of the acquisition strategy requires collaboration between the MDA, PM, 
and the functional communities engaged in and supporting DoD acquisition.  The DoD 
preference is evolutionary acquisition.  When a program uses an evolutionary acquisition 
strategy, each increment should have a specific set of parameters with thresholds and 
objectives appropriate to the increment.41   
The Acquisitions Program Baseline (APB) is developed.  Title 10 and DoD 
Instruction 5000.2 requires every program manager to document program goals prior to 




                                                 
40 B. Naegle. (9/6/2006). In-person interview. 
41 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition guidebook: Acquisition approach. 
Retrieved October 5, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=Guidebook/IG_c2.3.2.asp. 
42 Defense Acquisition University. (2006). Defense acquisition guidebook: The acquisition program 
baseline (APB). Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=GuideBook\IG_c2.1.1.asp. 
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the user/sponsor, prepares the APB for program initiation.  The PM revises the APB for 
each milestone review, and in the event of program restructurings or unrecoverable 
program deviations.43   
Technology demos are scheduled and reviewed.  Based upon the results of the 
verification of components, functionality, and system performance, a System 
Performance Specification should be created.  Trade-offs of achievable performance 
should be complete and captured in the Systems Specification.  Critical and/or enabling 
technologies should have demonstrated adequate maturity to achieve acceptable levels of 
risk.  The System Performance Specification serves as the guiding technical requirement 
for the system development effort.44  Also, the Initial Product Support Strategy is 
developed.  The program manager should develop a product support strategy for life-
cycle sustainment and continuous improvement of product affordability, reliability, and 
supportability, while sustaining readiness.  The support strategy is a major part of the 
Acquisition Strategy.  It helps to integrate the support strategy with the systems 
engineering processes.45 
A System Requirements Review (SRR) is conducted.  The SRR is conducted to 
determine progress in defining technical requirements.  This review decides the direction 
and progress of the systems engineering effort and the degree of convergence upon a 
balanced and complete configuration.46  It is normally held during Technology 
Development, but may be repeated after the start of System Development and 
Demonstration to clarify the contractor's understanding of redefined or new user 
requirements.  The SRR (Figure 4) is a multi-disciplined technical review to ensure that 
                                                 
43 Defense Acquisition University. (2005). Defense acquisition guidebook: APB approval. Retrieved 
September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=GuideBook\IG_c2.1.1.3.asp. 
44 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition guidebook: Demonstrate and validate 
the system concepts and technology maturity versus defined user needs. Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=GuideBook\IG_c4.3.2.3.9.asp. 
45 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Defense acquisition guidebook: Product strategy. 
Retrieved September 3, 2006, from 
http://akss.dau.mil/dag/DoD5000.asp?view=document&rf=Guidebook/IG_c2.3.12.asp. 
46 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: System requirements review (SRR). Retrieved September 
13, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=3222. 
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the system under review can proceed into the System Development and Demonstration 
phase, and that all system requirements and performance requirements derived from the 
Initial Capabilities Document or draft Capability Development Document are defined and 
are consistent with cost (program budget), schedule (program schedule), risk, and other 
system constraints. 
 
Figure 4.   SRR (From: https://acc.dau.mil/ifc/index.htm. Retrieved September 2006) 
 
A series of financial and budgeting reports are performed during this stage.  The 
Cost Analysis Requirements Description (CARD) provides a description of the salient 
features of the acquisition program and of the system itself.47 It is the common 
description of the technical and programmatic features of the program.  The CARD is 
prepared by the lead Component with inputs from participants. The CARD establishes a 




                                                 
47 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Cost analysis requirements description (CARD). 
Retrieved October 2, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2486. 
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include common salient system features as agreed to by the participants and Component-
unique requirements.48 The CARD is provided to the OSD Cost Analysis Improvement 
Group (CAIG). 
The CARD is used by subsequent cost analysis.  The Program Office Estimate 
(POE) is a detailed estimate of acquisition and ownership costs normally required for 
high-level decisions. The estimate is performed early in the program and serves as the 
base point for all subsequent tracking and auditing purposes.49  The POE leads to the 
Component Cost Analysis (CCA).  The CCA is a cost estimate prepared by an office or 
other entity of a Military Department that is outside the chain of command of that 
Military Department's authority responsible for developing or acquiring the program.50  
An Independent Cost Estimate (ICE) is a Life Cycle Cost Estimate (LCCE) for ACAT I 
programs prepared by an office that is not under the direction or control of the Military 
Department, Defense Agency, or other Component of the DoD that is directly responsible 
for carrying out the development or acquisition of the program, or if the decision 
authority has been delegated to a Component, prepared by an office or other entity that is 
not directly responsible for carrying on the development or acquisition of the program.51  
All of these cost analysis are used to determine affordability of the system under review.   
As with the Concept Refinement stage, exit criteria for the Technology 
Development stage is determined and the MDA approves the program for advancement.  
An ADM is issued and the program passes Milestone B, ending this phase.  There are 
delays that can occur during this stage also. 
Delays can affect a program within the Technology Development stage.  For 
example, the Army’s Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) ran into a series of 
                                                 
48 Defense Acquisition University. (2004). Joint program management handbook (3rd ed.). Fort 
Belvoir, VA: Defense Acquisition University Press.  
49 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Program office estimate (POE). Retrieved September 
27, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=1521. 
50 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Component cost analysis (CCA). Retrieved September 
27, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2407. 
51 Defense Acquisition University. Glossary: Independent cost estimate (ICE). Retrieved September 
27, 2006, from http://akss.dau.mil/jsp/GlossaryAbbreviations.jsp?acronymId=2820. 
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delays during this stage.  The FMTV was an Army program designed to replace all 2.5 
and 5 ton vehicles in the fleet.  The requirement was for 80,000 vehicles, and the program 
totaled $8B.  After the Tech Demo and Acq plan update, Congress decided that the plan 
was too expensive and told the Army to rescope it.  This delayed the program by over 3 
years.  Also, Congress fenced the funding and effectively modified the capability.  The 
Army pressed on with only 60% of the capability met.52  The rescope wasn’t wanted by 
the Army, and the delay wasn’t needed by the user.  This is another example of the 
timeline considerations that arise during the acquisitions process.  
4. Timeline Considerations 
As stated earlier, the process for reaching Milestone B usually takes 2 to 4 years.  
However, real-world scenarios have pushed this timeline out further.  As you can see by 
the two real-world examples, the timeline to reach Milestone B can extend to 7, and 
possibly 10 years, depending on the problems that arise.  No program has ever gone 
through the acquisitions system without some type of delay.  A delay can occur at any 
point and last months or even years.  In the meantime, capability to the warfighter is 
hampered and that could cause a detrimental effect.  As you can see by our real-world 
examples, the delay in the system kept the user from getting the capabilities for over 10 
years.   
D. SUMMARY 
The current acquisitions system (to include JCIDS) hasn’t met the critical need of 
expediting capability to warfighter.  With the fast pace of technology, the acquisitions 
process isn’t designed to effectively react to the changing landscape or threat.   Currently, 
there is no bridge between the acquisitions process and the need for rapid technology 
transference.  We believe that a venture capital initiative can fill this stop gap and ensure 
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III. AIR FORCE PROGRAMS 
There are several areas of concern with the concept of venture capital being used 
in the Department of Defense (DoD).  This chapter will explore the concerns of statutory 
authority, congressional aversion to risk, and the potential for conflict with existing 
programs.  Through this exploration, we will show that Congress will provide the 
necessary statutory authority for an Air Force venture capital initiative and that by 
providing this authority Congress shows its level of risk acceptance.  Once statutory 
authority and risk aversion are addressed, we will explore the numerous programs in 
existence for technology transference.  By exploring these programs available to Air 
Force Research Laboratory (AFRL), we looked to find a place where venture capital fit 
as a potential tool to expeditiously transfer technology from the private sector to the Air 
Force.   
A. STATUTORY AUTHORITY AND RISK AVERSION 
To discuss the need for statutory authority it must first be understood that in 
government funding it is has been affirmed repeatedly that without express authority 
from congress funding can not be spent.  The oft cited reference for this understanding is 
from the U.S Supreme Court who wrote “The established rule is that the expenditure of 
public funds is proper only when authorized by Congress, not that public funds may be 
expended unless prohibited by Congress.”53 So while Congress has provided a specific 
appropriation for the Air Force to carry out the activity of research and development, it 
has not stated explicitly that the Air Force can execute a venture capital initiative.  
Therefore, before any activity is undertaken to put a venture capital program in place, 
Congress must pass a law providing explicit consent. 
Understanding the necessity for explicit statutory authority, we move to the first 
two areas of concern, statutory authority and risk aversion, which we referenced together 
because in our opinion they are intertwined.  If congress is against venture capital usage 
based on risk aversion then they would exercise their responsibilities as lawmakers and 
                                                 
53 U.S v MacCollom 426 U.S.317, 321 (1976). 
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enact legislation with provisions against venture capital.  However, in recent history 
congress has done just the opposite and enacted legislation for the Department of the 
Army and Navy to explore venture capital as a means of expeditiously obtaining 
technologies. 
1. 2002 Defense Appropriations Act 
In 2002, lawmakers added the Army venture capital initiative to the Defense 
Department’s Appropriation Bill.  Lawmakers noted, “The Army's transformation plan is 
dependent on significant technological advances in weapons, armor, communications and 
propulsion systems, many of which will originate in the commercial technology 
development sector.”54  This was recognizing the importance of the commercial sector 
involvement in executing its internal transformation initiative.  One may question why 
the Army must rely so heavily on the commercial sector for technological needs.  The 
lawmakers stated factually, “Private companies have outspent the federal government in 
applied research for several years now and are spending a large and growing share of the 
country's basic research dollars.”55  Since the private sector has the resources in the 
market, they drive the priorities of that market.  Understanding the necessary dependence 
on the private sector to make the transformation plan work, why not use existing 
acquisition practices to develop relationships and obtain the technologies needed.  Once 
again we can turn to the lawmakers who observed, “…due in part to the rigidity of 
traditional contracting mechanisms as well as an acquisition culture that has little concern 
for the business needs and methods of the commercial world.  The Committee sees little 
hope for the Army to deliver the technological advances it promises without a major 
change in the way it exploits commercial technology to use the vitality, speed, and 
intellectual power of the U.S. commercial sector to its maximum advantage.”56  This 
observation led to the specific statutory authority for the Army to initiate a venture capital 
initiative, drawing on the CIA’s In-Q-Tel venture capital experience, to leverage the 
private sectors research advantage to obtain technologies needed for their transformation 
                                                 
54 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, House Report 107-298U.S.C. (2002).  
55 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, House Report 107-298U.S.C. (2002). 
56 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2002, House Report 107-298U.S.C. (2002). 
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effort.  This shows the statutory authority needed before a venture fund for the Army 
could be established and the level of risk Congress is willing to accept from a DoD 
agency. 
2.   2003 Defense Appropriation Act 
Again in 2003, lawmakers felt venture capital was worthwhile by including in the 
2003 Defense Appropriations Act a resolution telling the Navy to explore the feasibility 
of a venture fund.  Lawmakers recognized the inefficiencies in the traditional acquisition 
process by stating “…Navy's research and acquisition community historically has had 
great difficulty in transitioning innovative technologies from government research 
organizations and the commercial marketplace to active development and procurement 
programs.  Due to the constraints of internal planning and budgeting processes, and the 
stifling legacy of `programs of record', new Navy systems are often fielded with a high 
degree of technological obsolescence….”57  Recognizing these process inefficiencies and 
cultural risk aversion, lawmakers told the Navy to study the CIA’s, In-Q-Tel, venture 
capital initiative success to determine if the Navy could benefit from this type of 
initiative.  Once again this shows the Congress’s ability to both accept a level of risk 
consistent with venture capital funding and therefore provide the needed statutory 
authority to utilize venture capital as a tool to obtain the needed technologies.   
B. POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH EXISTING PROGRAMS 
Now that we discussed the statutory authority and risk aversion concerns, we will 
look at the numerous programs available to the Air Force in technology transference.  
Before diving into the programs themselves, we need to provide a definition of 
technology transference.  The Air Force technology transfer handbook defines 
technology transfer as “process by which existing knowledge, facilities, or capabilities 
developed under federal research and development (R&D) funding are utilized to fulfill 
public and private needs.”58  This definition leaves the impression that DoD performed 
the research and development effort and is now looking for ways to capitalize on those 
                                                 
57 Department of Defense Appropriation Act, 2003, House Report 107-532U.S.C. (2003). 
58 AFRL. (1/17/2002). Air force technology transfer handbook. Retrieved August 1, 2006 from 
http://www.dtic.mil/techtransit/. 
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efforts.  We are looking for a way to move technology developed in the private sector to 
the field.  Moving past the laboratories and actually have a working product to fulfill a 
need.  Bernard Chachula wrote in his evaluation of an Air Force venture capital initiative 
that we are striving for “technology transition”  which he defined as moving the 
technology from the lab to the program office and finally to the operational unit in the 
field.59  This is important because in order to work effectively with the private sector we 
must be able to communicate with each other and this definition provides a parallel to 
private sector actions of moving from technology to a product and finally into the 
marketplace.  Therefore, we define the need for technology transfer as Chachula did with 
technology transition.  This relationship is depicted in Figure 5. 
 
 
Figure 5.   Technology Transference Processes 
 
The Air Force department responsible for developing the technology of tomorrow 
is the AFRL.  Its stated mission is “Leading the discovery, development, and integration 
of affordable warfighting technologies for our air and space force”.60  In the course of 
accomplishing these activities it has several arrangements with private sector partners.  
These arrangements are contractual agreements as to who will do which actions and with 
what resources.  These agreements include the following: 
 
                                                 
59 B.M. Chachula. (2004). Evaluate initiation of an air force venture capital fund No. WBI-2004-1). 
Ohio: Wright Brothers Institute.  
60 AFRL. (May 23, 2006). AFRL mission and vision. Retrieved August 10, 2006 from 
http://www.afrl.af.mil/vision.asp. 
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• Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) 
• Cooperative Agreements (CA) 
• Education Partnering Agreements (EPA) 
• Partnership Intermediary Agreements (PIA) 
• Technology Investment Agreements (TIA) 
All of these agreements are provided for in law and have limitations concerning 
their use.   
1. Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADA) 
A CRADA is a written agreement between a private company and a government 
agency to work together on a project.  They allow the Federal government and non-
Federal partners to optimize their resources, share technical expertise in a protected 
environment, share intellectual property emerging from the effort, and speed the 
commercialization of federally developed technology.61  A point we would like to stress 
in this definition is that the technology is not provided to the Air Force, but instead is 
provided to the private company to turn into a product for the marketplace.  CRADAs are 
authorized under United States Code (USC) Title 15 Commerce and Trade Chapter 63 
Technology Innovation Section 3701.  The procedures for using CRADAs can be found 
in Air Force Instruction (AFI) 61-302 Cooperative Research and Development 
Agreements.  While we are not concerned with the procedures for establishing a CRADA 
we are concerned with what can and can not be done under a CRADA.  Table 1 identifies 











                                                 
61 US Department of the Interior. (August 15, 2006). Cooperative research and development 
agreements. Retrieved August 21, 2006 from http://www.usgs.gov/tech-transfer/what-crada.html.  
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Table 1.   CRADA 
 
From the Air Force:  From the CRADA partner: 
Personnel Personnel 
Personal Property Personal Property 
Facilities Facilities 
Services Services 
Intellectual Property Intellectual Property 
 Funds 
 
As you can see in Table 1, the Air Force does not provide funding under a 
CRADA and there in lies the problem.  While these agreements are wonderful at creating 
products for public or defense use, we are looking to fund cutting edge ideas that we have 
not found yet.  The fact that we provide the technology is the limitation of the CRADA 
when compared to an Air Force Venture Capital initiative.  In addition to a CRADA, 
AFRL can use CAs to accomplish technology transfer. 
2. Education Partnering Agreement (EPA) 
An EPA is a legal agreement between the Air Force and an educational 
institution.  EPAs are authorized under Title 10 USC Section 2194 and the AFI 61-301 
outlines what is provided to each party.  Under the law the Air Force may provide excess 
defense laboratory equipment, laboratory personnel to teach science courses or assist in 
the development of science courses, cooperate with the institution in developing a 
program under which students may be given credit for work on defense related projects, 
and provide academic and career advice to students62.  While EPAs provide the Air Force 
with the ability to influence basic research and development efforts, they are not focused 
on providing technologies to the warfighter today.  This is the primary focus of our 
proposed venture capital initiative.  Similar to an EPA is the PIA. 
 
                                                 
62 USAF, AFI 61-301 The Domestic Technology Transfer Process and the Offices of Research and 
Technology Applications, (2001). 
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3. Partnership Intermediary Agreement (PIA) 
A PIA is an agreement that provides for a partnership intermediary to perform 
services for the Federal laboratory that increase the likelihood of success in the conduct 
of cooperative or joint activities of a federal laboratory with small business firms and 
institutions of higher education.63  The partnership intermediary as found in 15 USC 
Section 3715 must be an agency of a state or local government or a nonprofit entity that 
is owned, funded, or operated by a state and local government that interacts with small 
businesses or institutions of higher learning.64  The purpose of the agreement is to 
transfer technology created in a federal laboratory to a small business that can make use 
of that assistance.  Like the agreements listed above the PIA has the technology flowing 
from the federal government to a private institution, although in this case it is through an 
intermediary, for the purpose of bringing a new product to the marketplace.  The final 
agreement we will discuss here is the TIA. 
4. Technology Investment Agreement (TIA) 
The TIA was Congress’s push to involve private for-profit companies that 
typically did not do business with the government in research and development efforts.  
The ultimate goal of a TIA is to foster the best technologies for future defense needs.65  
Under a TIA the Air Force could fund research with the intent of developing a 
technology for the commercial and defense marketplace.  So far the agreement sounds a 
lot like a venture capital initiative.  There are a couple of problems thought.  First, 
priority is given to consortium efforts.  This means that companies without other for-
profit partners may not receive funding due to their concerns over intellectual property 
rights.  Second, there is a requirement of cost sharing.  The cost sharing policy has an 
expectation of 50%.  While this shows the commitment of the company towards the 
technology/product, it limits the ability of possible participation by firms without the 
                                                 
63 15 USC. 3715 Use of Partnership Intermediaries, (2005), Retrieved September 5, 2006, from 
http://uscode.house.gov/search/criteria.shtml.  
64 15 USC. 3715 Use of Partnership Intermediaries, (2005), Retrieved September 5, 2006, from 
http://uscode.house.gov/search/criteria.shtml.  
65 DoD, DoD 3210.6-R DoD Grant and Agreement Regulations, Part 37 Technology Investment 
Agreements, (2003). 
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ability to fund their own operations.  The point of venture capital is to fund those firms 
that can not obtain funding through traditional channels (i.e. banks) and would therefore  
would not be in business.   
5. Small Business Innovation Research (SBIR) 
In addition to the agreements listed above AFRL also administers a grant-type 
program known as Small Business Innovation Research/Small Business Technology 
Transfer (SBIR/STTR).  As the name implies the SBIR program is designed to stimulate 
research initiatives by small businesses while providing the government with cost-
effective technical and scientific solutions66.  Similar to venture capital funding cycles, 
SBIR is a three step process.  During the phase one the feasibility of the technology is 
determined and contracts valued up to $100,000 are issued.  Phase one lasts from six to 
nine months.  Phase two starts following the successful completion of phase one.  During 
phase two the research and development effort is carried out to produce a well defined 
product or process.  Contracts for phase two are typically two years in length and are 
valued up to $750,000.  Phase three is the commercialization of the developed 
technology.  This is where SBIR stops.  The small business must find alternative sources 
of funding for this stage either from the private sector or through a federal (Non-SBIR) 
source.67  While SBIR does focus on small businesses, like venture capital, the big 
difference is the amount of funding provided to develop an idea for a technology into an 
actual product.  As you will see in the next section, $850,000 dollars does not even begin 
to provide the funding necessary to provide a successful technology in most industries. 
C. SUMMARY 
We believe that venture capital is a tool the Air Force can use to transfer 
technologies it needs to fulfill the requirements of the warfighter.  We know that 
Congress has accepted the level of risk necessary to operate a venture capital fund 
through its legislation authorizing and appropriating funds for multiple federal agencies, 
including the Army, to initiate their own venture capital fund.  Through this risk 
                                                 
66 AFRL. (2006). Air force small business innovation research. Retrieved August 12, 2006 from 
http://www.afrl.af.mil/factsht/sbirfactsheet.asp.  
67 AFRL. (2006). Air force small business innovation research. Retrieved August 12, 2006 from  
http://www.afrl.af.mil/factsht/sbirfactsheet.asp.   
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acceptance we believe Congress would provide the same statutory authority to the Air 
Force.  We also believe that while programs currently do exist to stimulate research and 
development efforts, venture capital does fit as another tool, which is necessary to meet 
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IV. ROLE OF VENTURE CAPITAL 
Traditionally, venture capital (VC) focuses on funding companies that do not have 
the size and assets necessary to acquire capital from public markets and banks.  The VC 
industry channels this needed funding to the new or growing companies which represent 
a good prospect for future success.   
 




As we can see from the illustration above VC-backed companies are an enormous 
source for jobs and inject trillions of dollars into the economy each year.. Subsequently, 
the use of VC in the United States Air Force (USAF) falls directly in line with 
Congressional goals of job creation through government programs. 
In an article published from the Air Force’s Outreach Program Office, President 
Bush is quoted as saying “small businesses create most new jobs in our country, and 
small businesses have been a driving force behind America’s tremendous economic 
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growth and job creation.”68  Using VC, through the VAPR program, allows the Air Force 
to meet its goals of technology transference and the President’s goals of job creation and 
economic growth. 
Additionally, Mr. Diamond from the Outreach Program Office was quoted as 
saying "America’s small businesses deliver support to the war fighter at every turn, 
whether we are talking about major weapons systems or parts of pieces of major systems, 
or subsystems that are supporting and rendering our Air Force capability as the best in the 
world.”69  Whether it is a guard at the gate of an Air Force installation, or one of the 
numerous contracted support functions, small business is an integral part of the Air Force 
structure.  Bolstering that support structure with VC-backed companies only stands to 
benefit the Air Force even more. 
In conjunction with providing investment funding to new companies VC firms 
can provide incubator funds for these companies as well.  In fact, the incubator funding 
model possesses great potential for the Air Force in how it can benefit from VC. 
Incubators provide a combination of financial, legal, management and other types 
of support to start-ups.  Incubators allow new/growing companies to take advantage of 
economies of scale, skills, experience and in some cases capital that might otherwise be 
lacking or out of reach in financial terms.  Additionally, incubators significantly cut down 
on start-up’s overhead.  The incubator recently set up by the internet firm, Lycos, for 
example, offers finance, office space and technical support to all its sponsored start-ups.   
The efficacy of incubators can most clearly be seen through a comparison of the 
traditional start-up model with the new incubator-based model.  While the old-style start-
up might take four to seven years (or even more) to become “market ready,” the 
incubator approach can produce the same effect in between two and five years.70  This 
                                                 
68 M. Cenkci. (April 12, 2006). Small business integral part of air force operations. Air Force Link, p. 
1. 
69 M. Cenkci. (April 12, 2006). Small business integral part of air force operations. Air Force Link, p. 
1. 
70 P. Burgess. (2002). The role of the venture capital provider. Retrieved September 28, 2006, from 
http://www.altassets.net/knowledgebank/learningcurve/2002/nz3275.php. 
 37
reduction in the acquisition timeline becomes especially appealing to the United States 
Air Force (USAF) for its ability to rapidly transfer needed technologies to the war fighter. 
A. VC FIT IN THE DOD ARENA 
Whether it is through incubators or business angels, the role of venture capital for 
the USAF must support rapid transference of technology while meeting capability 
requirements of the war fighter. 
1. Technology Transference 
Perhaps the most appealing aspect of VC to the DoD is its ability to rapidly 
transfer technology.  As we have seen from the discussion of acquisition timelines in 
section two, perhaps the largest roadblock to the transference of technologies is how long 
the current acquisition process takes.  As programs stretch on over longer periods of time 
requirements creep occurs and costs tend to increase significantly.   
While venture capital does not always guarantee success71 it has demonstrated in 
recent years to rapidly transfer technologies while meeting strong ROIs.  Conceivably the 
best example of venture capital at work for the DoD is the CIA’s program In-Q-Tel.  In-
Q-Tel has served as the non-profit, venture capital arm of the CIA for the past five years. 
Each year the CIA funds In-Q-Tel with approximately 37 million dollars.  To 
date, the CIA has invested in over 75 companies which have delivered more than 100 
technologies.72  This average of 20 technologies transferred each year is what has 
become so appealing about VC.  Yet what about the myriad technologies gained by the 
USAF each year under the current acquisition process. 
Currently, the problems with the traditional acquisition system are program 
overruns coupled with time delays.  While multiple technologies are transferred under the 
current acquisition process each year they are from programs that took five to seven years  
 
 
                                                 
71 L. Himelstein, P. Burrows, & A. Reinhardy. (1997). The great hunt for hot ideas. Retrieved 
September 21, 2006, from http://www.businessweek.com/1997/34/b354140.htm. 
72 T. O'Hara. (2005). In-Q-tel, CIA venture arm, invest in secrets. Retrieved August 16, 2006, from 
www.WashingtonPost.com. 
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(or more) to complete and cost much more than originally planned.  So, by the time the 
technology is finally acquired by the USAF its cost was so high one wonders if it was 
worth it, or is already outdated by current technology.   
Venture capital, through the CIA’s In-Q-Tel program, has shown it can rapidly 
transfer technologies to the investor(s) with great returns on the investment.  Over the 
past five years the CIA has managed to not only acquire over 100 technologies, but 
obtain an internal rate of return of 26%.  These numbers clearly indicate a need to include 
a VC arm in the USAF’s acquisition process. 
2. Meet Capability Requirements 
The role of the VAPR program is to satisfy capability requirements of the war 
fighter.  Currently, the USAF is attempting to move away from individualized program 
budgeting to capabilities-based budgeting.  To do this they have integrated the budgeting 
process with the AF corporate structure.  This created a deliberate, cross-functional flow 
of information allowing senior leadership to rack and stack needs.  Unfortunately, the full 
paradigm shift has yet to occur and as the integrated process teams move through the 
levels of leadership they still look at individual programs to fund versus capability. 
The VAPR program allows for the full paradigm shift to capabilities-based 
budgeting because it is not part of the current bureaucratic budgeting environment.  Like 
the In-Q-Tel program, VAPR will receive its own budget along with a requirements list 
from the USAF.  These requirements for technology and subsequent capabilities come 
directly from the COCOMs and MAJCOMs.  Using this approach allows the VAPR 
program to immediately probe the market for investment opportunities. 
B. VC CATEGORIES  
Although the Air Force as a whole could benefit from VC in almost all Venture 
Economics Industry Classification (VEICs) this program focuses on the rapid 
transference of technology for the war fighter in 38 categories.  The following list has 





Table 3.   USAF VAPR Program VEICS 
 
Rank VEIC Nomenclature Size ($M) Rank VEIC Nomenclature Size ($M)
1 9180 Advanced Aircraft/Aerospace 8.595 20 1630 Microwave Service Facilities 0.000
2 1810 Defense Communications 1.269 21 1640 Microwave & Satellite Components 20.130
3 3810 Military Electronics (excluding communications) 0.030 22 1699 Other Satellite & Microwave 1.470
4 4400 Biosensors 0.015 23 1500 Data Communications 6.153
5 4490 Other Biosensors 8.166 24 1399 Other Wireless Communications 13.875
6 1300 Wireless Communications 12.981 25 9160 Airfield & Other Transportation Services 1.782
7 3200 Batteries 8.583 26 2130 Optical Computing 10.479
8 3135 Sensors 13.209 27 2911 Voice Recognition 11.940
9 3139 Other Controllers/Sensors 16.017 28 2910 Voice Synthesis 5.472
10 2716 Graphics & Digital Imaging S/W 5.940 29 2739 ERP/Inventory/Software 10.104
11 2200 Computer Graphics & Digital Imaging 7.410 30 3100 Semiconductors-Electronic Components 4.920
12 2295 Digital Imaging Services 9.129 31 3110 Semiconductors 12.135
13 2290 Digital Imaging H/W & Equipment 7.461 32 3510 Laser Components (incl. beamsplitters, excimers) 24.081
14 2236 OBR (Optical Bar Recognition) 0.300 33 2125 Portable Computer (notebooks/laptops) 1.200
15 2234 OCR (Optical Character Recognition) 1.752 34 2122 Mini Computers 0.000
16 2238 MICR (Magnetic Ink Character Recognition) 0.006 35 3160 Display Panels 5.580
17 1620 Satellite Ground (& other) Equipment 4.860 36 1310 Mobile Comm., Pagers & Cell Radio 10.062
18 1610 Satellite Services/Carriers/Operators 13.902 37 1510 LANs (incl. voice/data PBX systems) 15.045
19 1600 Satellite Microwave Comm 0.540 38 1515 Wide Area Networks 14.823
USAF VAPR Program VEICs
 
      
Each of the above categories carries with it an optimum size (in Millions) which 
is needed to be competitive in its respective VC sector.  The “Size of Fund Necessary to 
be Competitive” section below statistically breaks out this optimal size fund for each of 
the VEICs in the above table.   
When compared to the hypothetical funding level of $50M for the VAPR 
program, approximately 10 VEICs can be utilized.  This number is based on an average 
VEIC funding requirement of $5.08M73.  Since not all VEICs can be funded at any one 
time (without an extremely large budget) the VEICs have been put into a prioritized order 
as seen in the table above.  The ranking of VEICs allows senior leadership to recognize 
which areas most require the funding based on limited resources.  In addition to ranking 
the VEICs, a funding policy must be created to account for possible distribution scenarios 
of program funds.  Two scenarios have been created and are captured in the next section. 
C. SIZE OF FUND NECESSARY TO BE COMPETITIVE 
Certain levels of funding, on average, are required to be competitive in the VC 
sectors listed in Table 3.  Competitiveness is defined as the ability to successfully transfer 
a technology and achieve the desired ROI for the investment through assertion of 
                                                 
73 $5.08 avg. funding per VEIC based on adding up the average cost per deal (over 5-year period) for 
each VEIC and dividing by 38 (total number of VEICs). 
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influence on the market.  In order to assert influence on the market the total fund size 
must be representative of what VC firms currently invest in the respective VEIC sectors 
to acquire technologies and their respective ROIs.  We use this as the level required to 
assert influence based on the assumption VC firms would not invest without the real 
probability of achieving a desired ROI. 
Regression analysis was used to determine if there is an appropriate level of 
funding required to achieve competitiveness within the market.  Each of the 38 VEIC 
codes listed in table 3 were analyzed separately to determine optimal size funds for the 
VAPR program to fund individually.  However, analyzing data for the 38 VEICs (table 3) 
over a five year period revealed there is no correlation between the amount of money 
invested per deal, the VEIC it was spent on, or the year in which it was spent.  This 
conclusion was derived from regression analysis conducted on the average amount 
invested per deal per VEIC and the average amount invested per deal for all VEICs 
combined over a five year period.  The ANOVA tables below summarize the regression 
analyses.  Table 4 contains an example of an analysis of just one VEIC and Table 5 
summarizes the average deal per year. 
 
Table 4.   One VEIC Regression Analysis Example 
 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 20.10724 20.10724 0.563155237 0.507486974
Residual 3 107.11384 35.70461333
Total 4 127.22108
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 90.0% Upper 90.0%
Intercept -2830.572 3784.802524 -0.747878385 0.508821551 -14875.50281 9214.358807 -11737.58787 6076.443867
Year 1.418 1.889566441 0.750436698 0.507486974 -4.595443737 7.431443737 -3.028836568 5.864836568  






Table 5.   Average VEIC Regression Analysis Example 
 








df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 1 0.679974245 0.679974245 0.265457399 0.64195616
Residual 3 7.684557832 2.561519277
Total 4 8.364532078
Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value Lower 95% Upper 95% Lower 90.0% Upper 90.0%
Intercept 527.3860789 1013.747677 0.520234069 0.638853583 -2698.811469 3753.583626 -1858.330635 2913.102793
X Variable 1 -0.260763158 0.50611454 -0.515225581 0.64195616 -1.871445506 1.34991919 -1.45183461 0.930308295  
       
Based on the poor f-statistics in the ANOVA tables above we would not accept 
any of the equations created by the analyses.  Therefore, we must conclude the mean is a 
better predictor of the cost per investment, or deal.  Additionally, to create the optimal 
fund size we must consider how many failures VC firms observe before reaping the 
benefits of a successful investment.  In an article by Business Week74 approximately one 
out of every three ventures fails.  For this reason the optimal size funds listed in table 3 
are based on the average amount invested per deal for each VEIC over a five year period 
multiplied by the number of investments required to get a one successful venture.  
Therefore, the optimal size funds that are listed in Table 3 are for acquiring one 
technology.   
It is important to note some VEICs have zero for their suggested fund size.  This 
is directly due to no investments made in those sectors for the past five years.  This lack 
of interest could be for many reasons.  Since VC typically is associated with new starts 
and out-of-the box products/services, these VEICs may not currently have anything new 
to bring to the market.  It could also be that no VC firms are looking for technologies in 
these areas.  Or, the lack of investment could be a result of projects that are unable to  
 
 
                                                 
74 L. Himelstein, P. Burrows, & A. Reinhardy. (1997). The great hunt for hot ideas. Retrieved 
September 21, 2006, from http://www.businessweek.com/1997/34/b354140.htm. 
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meet VC ROI requirements and are subsequently not worthy of VC support.  The VAPR 
program should be careful when approaching these sectors to ensure technologies are 
invested in that can return a sufficient ROI. 
Now that the optimal fund sizes have been analyzed and created the VAPR 
program must be set up to tackle typical funding constraints.  Since it is unlikely the 
VAPR program will only be interested in acquiring technology from one sector this paper 
analyzes and creates the optimal (on average) size fund needed by the VAPR program to 
utilize ten VEICs and five VEICs (called VAPR-LITE) respectively.  Additionally, 
knowing that the world of budgeting will most likely provide less than the optimal 
funding required to fully fund these scenarios a funding system must be created to 
maximize the technologies transferred. 
Two approaches are available when distributing funding across VEICs; the full 
funding approach and the weighted approach.  The full funding approach, as its name 
suggests, completely funds each VEIC in the VAPR program.  This is done in accordance 
to the ranking of the VEICs.  Tables 6 and 7 below, for the 5-VEIC and 10-VEIC 
programs respectively, represent the funding requirements to achieve the transference of 
one technology per VEIC: 
 
Table 6.   Funding Distribution Scenario (5 VEICs) 
 
Rank VEIC Nomenclature Size ($M)
1 9180 Advanced Aircraft/Aerospace 8.595
2 1810 Defense Communications 1.269
3 3810 Military Electronics (excluding communications) 0.03
4 4400 Biosensors 0.015
5 4490 Other Biosensors 8.166
18.075TOTAL FUNDING REQUIREMENT:
Funding Distribution Scenario 1, 5-VEICs
 









Table 7.   Funding Distribution Scenario (10 VEICs) 
 
Rank VEIC Nomenclature Size ($M)
1 9180 Advanced Aircraft/Aerospace 8.595
2 1810 Defense Communications 1.269
3 3810 Military Electronics (excluding communications) 0.03
4 4400 Biosensors 0.015
5 4490 Other Biosensors 8.166
6 1300 Wireless Communications 12.981
7 3200 Batteries 8.583
8 3135 Sensors 13.209
9 3139 Other Controllers/Sensors 16.017
10 2716 Graphics & Digital Imaging S/W 5.94
74.805TOTAL FUNDING REQUIREMENT:
Funding Distribution Scenario 2, 10-VEICs
 
       
As we can see in the preceding tables the full funding policy for the 5-VEIC 
program, VAPR-LITE, requires $18.075M for its budget.  Likewise, to fully fund the 10-
VEIC program requires $74.805M.   
Table 8, below, is an example of the full funding policy for the VAPR program 
(10 VEICs) receiving $50M for its budget.  This scenario takes into account that the goal 
of the VAPR program is to fund 10 VEICs thus acquiring 10 technologies: 
 
Table 8.   Full Funding Example 
 
Rank VEIC Nomenclature Size ($M)
1 9180 Advanced Aircraft/Aerospace 8.595
2 1810 Defense Communications 1.269
3 3810 Military Electronics (excluding communications) 0.03
4 4400 Biosensors 0.015
5 4490 Other Biosensors 8.166
6 1300 Wireless Communications 12.981
7 3200 Batteries 8.583
10 2716 Graphics & Digital Imaging S/W 5.94
14 2236 OBR (Optical Bar Recognition) 0.300




VAPR Full Funding Example
 
       
As we can see from Table 7, using the full funding policy for the top 10 VIECs 
requires, on average, $74.805M.  Therefore, a budget of $50M requires the program to 
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drop some of its top ten in lieu of cheaper alternatives down the list.  Table 8 illustrates 
how the program dropped the VEICs rank eight and nine and replaces them with 14 and 
15 respectively. 
The example above illustrates how funding will always leave unused funds in the 
budget unless the top ten are funded to requirement.  This left over funding leaves us with 
three options; 1) give the remaining money back, 2) make multiple investments in VEICs 
(in the top 10) inexpensive enough to allow it (e.g., invest more than once in VEIC 3810, 
Military Electronics), or 3) create a weighting system for the top 10 VEICs to allow for 
complete apportionment of the budget.   
While numbers one and two are viable options, creating a weighting system 
brings about two related areas of concern.  First, why would we not fully fund the optimal 
size of the VEIC if the optimal size is needed to be competitive and acquire the 
technology?  This becomes an important issue because if one chooses to fund ten VEICs 
with $50M when it requires $55M, the weighted factors, by nature, creates less than 
optimal funding patterns in each VEIC.  This directly relates to the second issue.   
Does competitiveness equate to transference of technology?  In other words, is 
competitiveness proportional to the dollars invested?  Earlier in this section we made the 
argument that to be competitive (have the ability to assert influence) we must fund each 
VEIC to the five-year average of what is invested by the market.  If we choose to fund 
only 90% of the optimal fund size do we get 90% of what we’re looking for, or is it 
actually less than that?  While creating a weighting system for the VEICs allows for full 
allocation of funds we conclude the lack of optimal funding affects competitiveness and 
the ability to influence the market and the technology the USAF is trying to acquire.  
Thus it is not appropriate for use in the VAPR program. 
D. SUMMARY 
Venture capital and its ability to find emerging technologies and quickly bring 
them to the market has a lot of potential for the Air Force.  Section two of this paper 
pointed out how long it takes the current acquisition process to produce a usable 
technology.  With such long lead times the technology is often outdated by the time of its 
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roll-out to the warfighter.  We argued in this section that the possibility for hastening 
technology transference lies not just with VC itself but with the use of incubator style VC 
funding.  These incubators produced usable technologies in as little as two to four years 
vice the four to seven with out them.   
However the Air Force chooses to fund its investments it must ensure it can be 
competitive in the market.  Competitiveness is the VAPR program’s ability to 
successfully transfer a technology and achieve the desired ROI for the investment 
through assertion of influence on the market.  We showed, through analysis, the average 
amount needed to be competitive in the venture capital markets was, in most cases, 
significantly higher than amounts authorized in the different phases of the SBIR 
program75 and other AF investment arrangements.  With higher than normal investment 
amounts the Air Force must decide how many technologies it wants to acquire each year 
and budget accordingly.  The VAPR (ten-technology) and VAPR-LITE (five 
technologies) programs each require different budgets relative to the full funding policy 
and number of technologies invested in.  While this leads to the discussion of what the 
VAPR program will look like programmatically, it also eludes to other issues such as 
self-sustainability, program profitability, AF use of the program, requirement sets, etc.  
We discuss these areas and more in the next section as we break out the VAPR program 
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V. USAF VC APPLIED PROCUREMENT RESPONSE (VAPR) 
Chapters II through IV discussed the acquisitions timeline, various secondary AF 
acquisition programs and the role of a VC initiative within the AF respectively.  With the 
role and fit of a VC initiative described it now becomes important to detail the actual 
program that is the VAPR SPO.  This chapter addresses the VAPR model in detail to 
include the VAPR mission, requirements generation process, process flow, program 
oversight, SPO/contractor coordination, for-profit versus not-for-profit, program funding 
and two measures of success. 
A. VAPR MISSION 
The purpose of the VAPR program is to support the Air Force’s mission of 
delivering sovereign options for the defense of the United States of America76.   In order 
to execute the mission of the Air Force we must be able to rapidly equip the warfighter 
with technologies capable of combating emerging global threats.  Subsequently, the 
VAPR program must support the acquisition process and Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld’s transformation guidance. 
The VAPR program supports the acquisition and transformation processes 
through its ability to rapidly transfer technologies.  Additionally, VC, by its very nature, 
follows the SECDEF’s guidance of creating a culture that is creative and takes prudent 
risks.  Using VC allows the USAF to proactively vice reactively pursue emerging 
technologies.  It allows the firms more familiar with their immediate markets to pursue 
the technologies instead of federal employees with limited market background.  
Although the main focus of the VAPR program is to rapidly transfer technologies 
to the USAF, a secondary benefit of job creation occurs from which the economy 
naturally benefits.  This paper will address this side-affect due to using a VC-based 
program, but only in part. 
 
 
                                                 
76 United States Air Force. Air force mission. Retrieved October 17, 2006, from 
http://www.af.mil/main/welcome.asp. 
 48
1. Technology Transference 
Before we begin to discuss the VAPR program’s goal of technology transference 
we need to readdress the definition created in Chapter III of this paper.  First, the Air 
Force technology transfer handbook defines technology transference as the “process by 
which existing knowledge, facilities, or capabilities developed under federal research and 
development (R&D) funding are utilized to fulfill public and private needs.”77 This 
definition creates the impression that DoD performed the R&D and is now looking for 
ways to capitalize on those efforts.   
Our goal with the VAPR program is to move technology developed in the private 
sector to the field moving past the laboratories and actually have a working product to 
fulfill a need.  Bernard Chachula wrote in his evaluation of an Air Force venture capital 
initiative that we are striving for “technology transition” which he defined as moving the 
technology from the lab to the program office and finally to the operational unit in the 
field.78 This is important because in order to work effectively with the private sector we 
must be able to communicate with each other and this definition provides a parallel to 
private sector actions of moving from technology to a product and finally into the 
marketplace.  Therefore, we define the need for technology transfer as Chachula did with 
technology transition.  This relationship is depicted in Figure 6.   
 
 
                                                 
77 AFRL. (1/17/2002). Air force technology transfer handbook. Retrieved August 1, 2006 from 
http://www.dtic.mil/techtransit/. 
78 B.M. Chachula. (2004). Evaluate initiation of an air force venture capital fund No. WBI-2004-1). 
Ohio: Wright Brothers Institute.  
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Figure 6.   USAF Technology Transference Process 
 
2. Job Creation (Secondary Benefit) 
While technology transference is the primary goal of the VAPR program, VC 
programs inevitably create jobs through their funding and support.  Job creation, by 
means of a USAF VC program, expands the industrial base used by the USAF creating 
many benefits from which to draw upon: 
• Allows small companies to bring technologies to the USAF that might 
otherwise be overlooked 
• VC is a way of courting new contractors into business with the 
government 
• Decreases reliance on small number of large contactor as only source of 
technologies 
• Helps the USAF meet small business contracting goals/requirements 
• Exponential increase in technology increase in the industry 
Additionally, creating/adding companies to the industrial base through a VC 
program helps to alleviate current perceptions of doing business with the DoD.  Since 
perception is often reality it becomes important to find a way to reframe how the market 
thinks about doing business with the government. 
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A survey conducted by the school of public policy at the University of Baltimore 
(2003) researched the IT industry’s attitude on doing business with the DoD.  The 
current, common perceptions from the 400 vendors and non-vendors are; 1) DoD doesn’t 
know what they want (constantly changing requirements), 2) the application/bid process 
is too long and confusing, 3) DoD only wants to deal with large companies, 4) our 
products are not needed by the DoD, 5) we do not want work with the DoD and 6) there 
are too many barriers to the bid process.79 
Removing the perceptions above greatly benefits the USAF and increases its 
ability to find needed technologies to support the warfighter.  Additionally, as the USAF 
transitions to capabilities-based programming it needs to be able to identify and exploit 
new technologies.  The following section discusses how the VAPR program provides a 
method for identifying and filling capability shortfalls. 
B. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION PROCESS 
The importance of the requirements generation process and supporting activities 
can not be understated. With the transformational shift happening within the DoD, it is 
clear that efficiency in generating requirements is critical.  The VAPR Program serves as 
a supplement to the acquisitions lifecycle and overarching JCIDS structure through its 
ability to rapidly identify critical capabilities.  It does not replace the existing 
requirements, nor does it add any steps to the existing acquisitions structure.  Due to the 
existing size, requirements generation, oversight, and control mechanisms for large 
ACAT I and II programs, the VAPR program is tailored to fit the generation process for 
ACAT III needs.  However, it serves as a reach back for incorporating technologies for 
these larger systems.  The critical aspect of VAPR is the adaptability to Air Force needs.    
Instead of adding another layer to the capabilities identification process, the 
VAPR program provides an avenue to expedite existing technologies, explore less  
 
 
                                                 
79 University of Baltimore, Schaefer Center for Public Policy. (2003). Survey of information 
technology firms. 
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traditional technological sources, and leverage emerging technologies into the hands of 
the warfighter.  As such, a separate identification process is required for the VAPR 
initiative. 
1. Process Flow 
To begin, capability requirements are generated at the center level.  Each center 
ranks and prioritizes the list based on existing criteria established by the MAJCOMs.  
The centers then submit their prioritized listings to their respective MAJCOMs for 
coordination and consolidation.  The MAJCOMs prioritize the consolidated lists based on 
their established guidance.  Finally, the merged lists are sent to the Air Staff for review.   
At the Air Staff level, a board consisting of seven members assigns the final 
prioritization based on Air Force and Joint Strategic guidance.  The board should consist 
of 5 voting members and two advisory members.  The purpose of the board is to 
prioritize, at the strategic level, capabilities to enhance warfighter capability to meet the 
Air Force mission.  The board consists of:      
• A8 – Strategic Plans and Programs 
• Provides long-term planning and programming for the Air Force. 
Develops, integrates and analyzes the $672 billion Air Force 
Future Years Defense Program (FYDP) and Long Range Plan to 
support the national military strategy. Formulates and evaluates 
options relating to readiness, sustainability, force structure and 
modernization for SECAF/CSAF. 
• A3/A5 - Air, Space and Information Operations, Plans and Requirements 
(2 positions) 
• Develops Air Force critical infrastructure strategy, policy and 
objectives, prepares and implements plans and programs, and 
advocates plans, operations and funding to departmental and 
governmental agencies. 
• Determines operational requirements, capabilities and training 
necessary to support national security objectives and military 
strategy 
• SAF/AQ – Acquisition (Co-Chair) 
• Responsible for securing dominant aerospace power, world-class 
technology, streamlined acquisition, affordable, timely and 
effective integrated systems, supplies, and services for the 
warfighter 
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• SAF/USA – Space Acquisitions (Co-Chair) 
• Air Force professionals providing the nation and the joint 
warfighter improved aerospace capability through integrated and 
modernized aerospace systems 
Two roles are established as advisory positions to the board: 
• Air Force Material Command (AFMC)  
• Air Force Space Command (AFSC) 
The board consolidates all lists and produces the Air Force Master List. This list 
is approved by both SAF/AQ and SAF/USA as co-chairs and is finalized for the Air 
Force.  This finalized list is sent to the VAPR SPO.  The SPO becomes the process owner 
and advocate of the Air Force Master List.   
Unlike the OnPoint or In-Q-Tel models, VAPR utilizes the prioritization method 
for ranking technology requirements.  As established above, the Air Force creates a 
Prioritized Master Listing to highlight critical requirements and focus the upcoming 
venture capital effort on those.  OnPoint designates investment focus areas that 
concentrate on certain, small technology advances.  Also, with In-Q-Tel, the CIA doesn’t 
dictate to the firm the specific technologies.  It does provide guidance, but unlike the Air 
Force, doesn’t prioritize a list of technologies to pursue. 
2. Program Oversight 
At the heart of VAPR program is the system program office (SPO). The "SPO 
concept" has developed gradually since World War II as the development of aircraft, 
space assets, and associated components became more complex and expensive. Built on 
General Schriever's experience in managing the Air Force's ballistic missile development 
program, the SPO consists of a dedicated engineering and procurement cadre together 
with representatives from the using command(s), including the logistics command. The 
SPO attempts to anticipate all stages in the development and operational life cycle of a 
particular system.  This underlying theory applies to the VAPR concept.  
The Organization of the VAPR SPO follows the standard format as selected by 
AFMC and SMC.  This standardized format has been predominate in the Air Force for 
decades and is used as the template.  The SPO organization: 
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• Allows early identification of a capability while supporting an evolving 
requirement definition process 
• Minimizes the risk of obsolescence posed by the rapid pace of technology 
development 
• Allows user (SAF/AQ) to make informed decisions based on cost, 
schedule, and performance  
• Predict when a system will require improvements to accommodate future 
requirements 
• Identifies deficiencies within the venture capital application availability of 
technology insertion, deficiency reports, and systems engineering 
requirements 
• Acts as a single point of contact for all venture capital related actions 
within the Component 
The SPO is subdivided into Area of Responsibilities (AORs) creating specified 
roles and responsibilities.  The SPO AORs and required manpower needed to execute 
these roles are identified below.  The office-specific responsibilities are also identified. 
Front Office: 
The front office consists of a minimum of four individuals.  The VAPR program 
is commanded by an O-6 or GS equivalent as the SPD.  The VAPR/CC (SPD) reports 
directly to SAF/AQ and is responsible to SAF/AQ for:  
• Establishing performance metrics for the Venture Capital firm(s) 
• Allocating resources to accomplish Venture Capital objectives 
• Forming program objectives  
• Developing SPO Strategic goals, vision statement, in support of SAF/AQ 
strategic goals 
• Assessing cost, schedule, or performance against the program baseline 
• Conducting source selection and source selection training 
The VAPR/CV will: 
• Direct SPO in absence of the SPD 
• Execute duties as assigned by the SPD 
The remainder of the front office is an administrative detail (2 people) assigned to 
the SPD.   
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Finance: 
The Finance AOR is responsible for supporting the SPD with customer-focused 
decision support, managing the VAPR SPO resources and assisting with effective and 
efficient resource stewardship.  This position is comprised of 1 financial specialist.  The 
responsibilities are: 
• Budget formulation 
• Budget Execution analysis   
• Funds Certification 
• Liaison between the SPO and Contracting 
Contracting: 
All contracting functions will be provided thru SAF/AQ.  Due to the limited 
contracting requirements needed by the SPO, a separate, collocated contracting office 
isn’t required.  The SAF/AQ office will coordinate with the SPD during source selection 
for the venture capital contract, and with finance for all support/service contracts or 
needs.  The SPO communicates the contracting requirements through the Comprehensive 
Cost and Requirements System (CCaRs).     
AFRL Liaison: 
AFRL will provide a point-of-contact for coordinating with the SPO.  Collocated 
personnel support is not needed.  However, information sharing between the two agencies 
is needed. 
Engineering Support: 
Engineering support (2 positions) is required to ensure technological investments 
are meeting the AF needs.  Their roles are, but limited to: 
• Translating technical information into reportable data for SPD 
• Reviewing technical reports  
• Analyzing performance parameters 
• Making recommendations to SPD on future technology needs 
• Assessing the condition and applicability of technology investments 
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• Coordinating with other SPOs for technology inclusion into larger systems 
(subsystems) 
• Coordinating technology advancements between SPO and AFRL 
The VAPR SPO will be placed in a geographical location that allows for constant 
contact and interaction with the venture capital firm and subsequent industry.  Co-
locating the SPO is imperative to ensure successful collaboration. 
The VAPR model has contrasts with both OnPoint and In-Q-Tel concerning 
oversight.  VAPR applies an additional SPO reporting requirement to control the Air 
force venture capital initiative.  MILCOM, a venture-backed company that conceives, 
creates and launches technology companies in partnership with defense contractors, has 
oversight of the OnPoint Initiative.  MILCOM was chosen by the Army in 2003 to 
manage the venture capital fund.  The Air Force will maintain oversight and control 
through the SPO.  In-Q-Tel is similar to OnPoint with reference to oversight.  The 
companies designated to control venture capital initiatives are in control of the funding 
place on contract.  It is done on behalf of the government agency, with their priorities in 
mind.  If the government agency is not satisfied, contract cancellation is an option each 
year. 
3. SPO/Venture Capital Firm Coordination 
The SPO is the single Air Force POC for coordination with the venture capital 
firm.  The interaction between the SPO and the VC firm consists of: 
• Relationship management between the Air Force and the VC firm 
• Contract negotiation and annual renewal 
• Defining critical technological needs  
• Assess performance 
• Perform coordinated quarterly reviews on cost, schedule, and performance   
• Share information on investment activity within the commercial sector 
• Consultation between the SPO and VC Firm for assessment of strategic fit 
and mission value of venture capital transactions 
• ensure compliance with business ethics and all applicable laws and 
regulations 
 56
All other responsibilities will be addressed as needed within the language of the 
contract vehicle.  The driving principle is that the U.S. Air Force needs to seek 
technologies that will vastly increase the effectiveness of our airmen.  The VC/Air Force 
relationship is built on the concept of addressing the needs of the service, proactively 
seeking out technology advances, both traditional and non-traditional means, and 
provides reach-back capability for the acquisitions processes that dominate the Air Force 
procurement model.     
C. FOR PROFIT VS. NOT-FOR-PROFIT 
Many arguments can be made concerning using a for-profit or a not-for-profit 
schema for the VC contractor for the VAPR program.  The CIA’s contractual relationship 
with In-Q-Tel is a not-for-profit set up using a fixed price contract.  In-Q-Tel’s profits are 
taken from the difference in cost to execute the program and the amount of money 
contracted for that year.  Rosettex (the NGA’s VC arm), on the other hand, is a for-profit 
arrangement.  According to their agreement with the government 75% of the returns from 
investments plus the original investment are returned to the fund for future investments.  
The remaining funds are profits retained by Rosettex.80   
Choosing for-profit versus not-for-profit depends primarily on two decisions; 1) 
creating a fund that is self-sustainable, or one that requires continuous funding and 2) 
incentivizing the contractor to attain the greatest returns.  
1. Self-Sustainability vs. Continued Funding  
Today’s resource environment and its finite nature preclude decision makers from 
supporting too many programs that are resource intensive by nature.  For this reason the 
VAPR program must take an approach that minimizes the use of resources in the long-
term.  Minimizing long-term resource reliance allows the USAF greater flexibility for 
funding other future MDAPs.  For this reason, a self-sustaining fund is necessary for the 
VAPR program to provide technologies to the Air Force over the long-term with 
minimum drain on finite resources. 
                                                 
80 B.M. Chachula. (2004). Evaluate initiation of an air force venture capital fund No. WBI-2004-1). 
Ohio: Wright Brothers Institute. 
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Seed money is required to begin a self-sustaining venture capital fund.  To 
minimize long-term use of financial resources we must first determine how long the seed 
money is required.  This is determined by investigating how long it takes before 
investments begin providing returns.  Return time is needed because the estimate of time 
determines when the last year of seed money is required based on size of returns.    For 
example, if the investments from the first year’s investments pay out in year five then that 
year’s funding requirement should be reduced by that return amount (less profit).  
Eventually, enough returns add up completely making up for the seed money at which 
time seed money is no longer required.   
The analysis of investment return times was conducted focusing primarily on late-
stage investments because, on average, late stage investments require two years before 
they provide a return.81  While investing in stages other than late-stage investments is not 
prohibited it does increase the length of time required before seeing a return on the 
investment.  Additionally, the late-stage approach is in line with the desire for the VAPR 
program to rapidly transfer new technologies.  Not only does it provide a quicker return, 
but it allows the AF to leverage its funding off of already existing investments by 
providing funding to push the investment past the final stages and to the 
market/warfighter. 
In the interest of conservatism we took into account the failure rates associated 
with VC funds as discussed in Chapter IV.  This is done by using the optimal fund sizes 
created in Chapter IV of this paper.  Since the failure rates are already built into the 
optimal investment sizes we did not deduct an additional amount in this section when 
computing returns based on the investment amounts.  To do so would double count the 
failure rates and distort potential earnings. 
As stated above, the average time late-stage VC funds require to see the returns 
on their investments is two years.  Additionally, the average pooled IRR for late-stage 
investments is, on average, 13.6%.  Reference Table 9 below for IRR details for each 
type of fund: 
                                                 
81 L. Himelstein, P. Burrows, & A. Reinhardy. (1997). The great hunt for hot ideas. Retrieved 
September 21, 2006, from http://www.businessweek.com/1997/34/b354140.htm. 
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Table 9.   IRR Details 
 
 Fund Type  Num  Avg 
 Cap Wtd 
Avg 
 Pooled 
Avg  Max  Upper  Med  Lower  Min 
 Early/Seed VC 558.00    16.00      6.50      19.60    721.00  15.70    2.70      (7.00)       (54.70)    
 Seed Stage VC 65.00      9.60        1.90      9.90      257.70  13.30    3.90      (3.60)       (27.50)    
 Early Stage VC 493.00    16.80      6.70      20.50    721.00  15.90    2.60      (7.30)       (54.70)    
 Balanced VC 444.00    9.60        5.60      14.20    195.20  15.10    5.50      (1.20)       (86.10)    
 Later Stage VC 188.00    11.00      6.20      13.60    209.20  15.60    5.10      (1.20)       (100.00)  
 Total Inv/Avg IRR 1,748.00 12.60      5.38      15.56    420.82  15.12    3.96      (4.06)       (64.60)    
 Cumulative Fund Type  Calculation Type: IRR  Primary Market: US 
 
 
If we apply the average return time to the average amount returned we see the 
seed money can be completely replaced, on average, with investment returns within two 
years. 
It is important, however, to look at investment return times and amounts for VC 
funds other than later-stage funds.  This is because it is improbable that enough later-
stage technologies will exist at the time of investment to satisfy the amount of money the 
AF wants to invest.  Subsequently, an analysis comparing “early-stage” funds, “average” 
funds and “later-stage” funds was conducted.  Table 10 below illustrates the returns of 
each fund and how long each fund takes before seed money is no loner required.  The 
numbers listed in below in Table 10 include a 25% award fee.  This will be discussed in 
greater detail in the subsequent section. 
 
Table 10.   USAF Return on Investment 
 
IRR, Early-Stage (20.50%)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
AF Investment 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 86.30627 86.30627 86.30627 86.30627
Return 0 0 0 0 0 86.30627 86.30627 86.30627 86.30627 86.30627
IRR, Balanced (14.20%)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
AF Investment 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 74.805 82.77173 82.77173
Return 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 82.77173 82.77173 82.77173
IRR, Later-Stage (13.60%)
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7 Year 8 Year 9 Year 10
AF Investment 74.805 74.805 74.805 82.43511 82.43511 82.43511 90.84349 90.84349 90.84349 100.1095






2. Incentivizing the Contractor 
Now that we have determined the AF is best supported with a self-sustaining VC 
fund we must now determine how to best incentivize the contractor to obtain the greatest 
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returns possible.  While In-Q-Tel has had success with their fixed price contract model 
they are not a self-sustaining fund.  They use one-year options as the carrot for their 
contractor to perform.  While they are providing an award fee as part of the FFP contract 
they can cancel the program at anytime due to poor performance. 
VAPR requires a slightly different approach due to its self-sustaining approach.  
In fact, the best approach is one that was mentioned earlier as used by Rosettex.  To 
incentivize the contractor to obtain the greatest returns one must tie the contractor’s fee to 
the returns themselves.  In line with this theory, the VAPR program offers the contractor 
a 25% award fee.  Using a percentage allows the award fee to fluctuate with the returns.  
The greater the return the contractor achieves the greater the award fee will be.   
While this award fee in line with Rosettex’s model it is differs from the In-Q-Tel 
model.  In-Q-Tel's pay philosophy is focused on aligning pay with performance and with 
fulfilling the company's mission-how well the company and its employees achieve 
mission goals in serving the CIA and the IC.82  VAPR, while it doesn’t incentivize 
individual members, it does incentivize the company for meeting performance goals, as 
outlined above.                
The award fee for the VAPR program is best supported with a FFP contract 
vehicle.  The FFP contract does not provide funding for the contractor’s operations.  
Instead, it is strictly set up to provide funding for the VAPR program’s investments.  It 
does include verbiage, however, to allow for the contractor to be awarded 25% of the 
investments returns.  Additionally, the contract must be set up to have the original 
investments returned to a pool for future investments.  This, in essence, is the basis for 
the self-sustaining fund.     
Unfortunately, tying the contractor’s profits directly to the returns of each 
investment can promote an investment strategy that doesn’t pick the technology best 
suited for the AF, but one that provides the best return.  To prevent the contractor from 
picking investments strictly based on return rates the contract will be set up with one-year 
                                                 
82 In-Q-Tel. Investing in our nations security. Retrieved November 4, 2006, from http://www.in-q-
tel.com/about/index.htm#Overview. 
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options.  Using the one-year options provides the Air Force with the ability to cancel the 
contract if they don’t feel the investments are being made in the best interest of the Air 
Force overall.   
D. FUNDING 
The funding required for the VAPR program is in direct relation to the self-
sustainability of the program.  Since we elected to use a self-sustaining fund over a 
continuously funded VC fund we must address how to budget for such a program.  The 
VAPR program initially requires seed money to get started and remain viable for the 
long-term.  This brings up two areas that must be addressed; 1) how much seed money is 
required each year and 2) how many years does the USAF provide the seed money. 
Table 10, above, illustrated three VC stages and their subsequent return times and 
amounts.  Also, as noted earlier, it is unlikely the contractor will only be able to invest in 
later-stage technologies albeit that is the goal.  Therefore, it is most likely a balanced 
approach will happen resulting in an average IRR of 14.2%.  Additionally, based on 
receiving $74.805M for ten investments (based on Table 7) it is estimated the Air Force 
must provide funding for approximately eight years before the fund begins to pay for 
itself.  This estimate is based on returns occurring during around 7.5 years.  Therefore the 
AF must fund the beginning of the eighth year.  Table 10 shows that in year eight the 
returns, plus original investments, minus award fees equate to a fund of approximately 
$82.772M. 
The VAPR funding strategy differs when compared to other DoD VC models.  
First, it requires seed money due to its goal of self-sustainment within eight years.  This is 
vastly different from the OnPoint initiative, which requires additional, appropriated 
funding each year.  Also, the funding range for VAPR is approximately $15K to $16M 
per VEIC in the priority list.  This is an extreme range when compared to OnPoint 
investments, which typically range from $500K to $2M.  
E. MEASURES OF SUCCESS 
As stated above, one of the main roles of the VAPR SPO is to monitor 
performance of the fund.  This is done in a variety of ways.  There are, however, two 
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important measurements that must be considered when discussing fund performance.  
First, it is important to know how much of a Return on Investment (ROI) has been 
achieved.  This will determine how much bang for the AF’s buck the VAPR program is 
generating.  Second, an Internal Rate of Return must be managed.  This measurement 
will take into account the time value of money concerning VAPR investments.  These 
two measurements are discussed in detail below and will be monitored quarterly by the 
VAPR SPO as indicators of growth and fund success. 
1. ROIs 
Return on Investment formula (ROI = Net Profit / Amount Invested) will be used 
to determine acceptable levels of growth from each investment.  However, there are some 
concerns that must be addressed when using ROI to value projects. 
ROI calculations may over-value investments since the calculations are often 
slanted to favor short-term cost savings and overlook long-term costs such as 
maintenance, support and integration costs.   Additionally, The ROI calculation does not 
take into account time value of money or risk associated with the project or investment. 
The time value of money concept says that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar 
tomorrow. This is especially true when considering other investment alternatives and the 
effect of inflation from a macro economic perspective.  Finally, the many ways to 
calculate ROI creates a problem of consistency in companies.  Few companies have 
developed a consistent ROI methodology thus making it difficult to accurate compare the 
value of multiple projects.  In an attempt to address the inconsistency problem the 
formula listed above will be used for valuing all VAPR projects.   
In support of calculating ROI for investments, Price Waterhouse Coopers has 
created a table to illustrate the growth needed to match a particular investment and yield a 











The preceding table, created by Price Waterhouse Coopers83, is a listing of what 
venture capitalists typically invest based on the estimated growth of the company being 
invested in.  The AF, in conjunction with its contractor, should use a similar approach to 
the one used in the table above to ensure an adequate return is reached.   
2. IRR 
One benefit IRR has over ROI is that it addresses the time value of money issue.  
IRR is a discount rate (return rate) at which the present value of a series of investments is 
equal to the present value of the returns of those investments.84  This is a sound 
measurement for use by the VAPR SPO due to its ability to measure irregular 
investments and subsequent sales of those investments.  As investments are made, IRR’s 
                                                 
83 Price Waterhouse Coopers, 9th Ed., Three Keys to Obtaining Venture Capital, Pricing and Control: 
The Investor’s Perspective (p. 6). 




true usefulness can be utilized.  IRR provides the ability to compare potential 
investments.  While the main goal of the VAPR program is rapid transference of 
technology, it does not make sense to invest in a technology you can acquire in two years 
if you lose money on the return.  For this reason, IRR will serve as the main methodology 
for selecting between investments. 
F. SUMMARY 
The VAPR model’s overarching goal is to rapidly transfer technologies to the 
warfighter.  The model is designed to take advantage of existing VC models within the 
DoD by implementing their various aspects to best fit Air Force needs.  This is similar in 
respect to OnPoint.  While VAPR works on a much broader scale, its goal  of rapid 
technology transference is identical to On Point’s goal.  As stated on OnPoint’s website, 
it is designed “to accelerate the transition of new, or significantly improved, technologies 
into the U.S. Army.”85 Additionally, by setting up VAPR to be self-sustaining (through 
up-front seed money) the Air Force can create a long-term VC fund without tapping 
future resources.  To ensure a successful program the SPD will use ROI and IRR as 
measures of profitability and a means for comparing projects respectively.   Its ability to 
move technology from the private sector to the user in conjunction with its design to 
satisfy capability requirements allows VAPR to meet Air Force needs quickly and at 
minimal cost. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The research accomplished for this document shows that the Air Force could 
benefit from a venture capital initiative.  This conclusion was drawn as the exploration of 
the traditional acquisition process, other Air Force programs, and how a venture capital 
initiative might fit within these existing programs was accomplished.  While we came to 
the same conclusion as previous research efforts by Bernard Chachula when he wrote 
“Evaluate Initiation of an Air Force Venture Capital Fund” for the Wright Brothers 
Institute in 2004, our research was focused on the current processes and than selecting 
what we thought is the best approach to implementing a venture capital initiative. 
The traditional acquisition process is essentially a risk management tool.  This 
tool is effective in minimizing the risk of failure on programs and assigning multiple 
parties to be accountable.  To minimize those risks DoD has sacrificed flexibility and 
timeliness.  Minimizing those risks are important because it is demanded by the 
American public who trust us to achieve success with the funds they provide.  However, 
with the pace of technological change increasing by the time an acquisition program is 
actually delivered there is the increased risk of technological obsolescence in the field.  
Add to this the fact that our current enemies are constantly changing the methods used to 
employ violence against our forces, and it can be seen why venture capital may be a 
possible tool to achieve newer technologies faster than the traditional process.   
In addition to the traditional method of acquisition, the Air Force also utilizes 







All of these programs provide a way for the Air Force to interact with universities 
and other research oriented organizations to achieve a technological advantage.  The 
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SBIR program acts just like a venture capital initiative by providing funds to small 
businesses trying to bring a new idea into reality.  However, as talked about in Chapter III 
the programs have two potential flaws.  One potential flaw is the concept of “technology 
transference” which the Air Force technology transfer handbook defines as “process by 
which existing knowledge, facilities, or capabilities developed under federal research and 
development (R&D) funding are utilized to fulfill public and private needs.”86  This 
definition implies that the research is conducted in the public sector using public sector 
funds and than transferred to the private market to push for more uses of that technology.  
The goal of a venture capital initiative would be to leverage private sector resources to 
obtain technology developed in the private sector for use by the warfighter.  The second 
potential flaw was the scale of the programs.  The SBIR program, which acts just like a 
venture capital initiative, can only provide $850,000 for development of an idea into a 
usable product.  This amount does not provide for the average investment needed in 
several areas of research, as discussed in Chapter IV, to be successful.  With the 
traditional process being slowed down by bureaucracy and the other than traditional 
programs available not of the necessary scale to achieve a usable product the research 
turned to the role a venture capital initiative would play in complementing the existing 
programs. 
A venture capital initiative provide the Air Force with a tool that can move faster 
and be more flexible than the traditional process while maintaining a scale beyond that of 
other than traditional programs.  The program can be more flexible because, as discussed 
in Chapter IV, the money and the capabilities needed are provided to a venture capital 
firm who then finds prospective companies to invest in.  By moving the process outside 
the bureaucracy of the Air Force, the company can make choices faster to provide the 
best return for the government and in turn themselves.  In order to be effective, the Air 
Force must decide which categories to focus the venture fund on and then fully fund the 
categories selected.  Chapter four provided an example of a five and ten category 
investment fund and the appropriate size of those funds.  Full funding provides the 
                                                 
86 AFRL. (1/17/2002). Air force technology transfer handbook. Retrieved August 1, 2006 from 
http://www.dtic.mil/techtransit/. 
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venture fund with the necessary resources to achieve the objectives the Air Force asks it 
to achieve.  One of the causes for delays and cost increases in the traditional model is the 
inability of the government to guarantee the contractor that funds will be available to 
continue the program if they are achieving the goals set by the government.  This causes 
more contracts to be written and causes the contractor to price in the risk of not 
continuing a program.  Through the exploration of the role of venture capital as a tool for 
the Air Force the questions of how the Air Force model would look and operate came 
into mind. 
The Venture capital Applied Procurement Response Model (VAPR) provides the 
Air Force with the ability to rapidly transfer technology to the warfighter.  The model, as 
discussed in Chapter V, takes attributes of multiple models, including the CIA’s In-Q-Tel 
and the Army’s OnPoint models, and builds one the Air Force can use to implement 
VAPR.  The Air Force side of the model operates like a SPO in interacting with the 
venture capital firm and providing the oversight needed when using government funds.  
While the Air Force plays no role in the actual selection of the companies the venture 
firm will invest in, the Air Force provides a list of the needs and on an annual basis 
performs an evaluation of the venture firms efforts to determine if the contract with them 
will continue.  This is an attempt to obtain goal congruency for the government and the 
contractor.  With the appropriate personnel and the latitude to execute the mission, as 
outlined in Chapter V, the VAPR model could provide the Air Force with the appropriate 
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